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Abstract
Several fundamental issues in establishing security in continuous variable quantum
key distribution are discussed, in particular on reverse reconciliation and security un-
der heterodyne attack. It appears difficult to derive quantum advantage in a concrete
realistic protocol due to source and loss uncertainties, apart from the problem of bound-
ing Eve’s information after reconciliation. The necessity of proving robust security for
QKD protocols is indicated.
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I INTRODUCTION
Continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) was introduced [1-4] as an alter-
native QKD approach to the discrete signal BB84 protocol for quantum key generation [5].
The original 3 dB loss limit [1] under beamsplitter attack is extended to arbitrary loss under
reverse reconciliation (RR) in [2-4]. In this paper we will point out several fundamental secu-
rity issues in a finite realistic implementation which are intrinsic to the physics of CV-QKD,
as well as the basic cryptographic issue of bounding Eve’s information after reconciliation
before privacy amplification. It appears that a net key can be generated in CV-QKD not
from quantum advantage, but only by classical postdetection processing [5,6], which is very
inefficient and in fact its general security has never been fully established. However, coher-
ent detection used in CV-QKD has the advantage of being not susceptible to the detector
blinding attacks [7] on single-photon avalanche detectors widely employed in BB84 protocols.
Perhaps the combination of coherent detection and BB84 signals in [8-9] would be useful for
such purpose. More significantly, CV-QKD brings out clearly the important point that proof
of robust security is needed in physical cryptography.
II CV-QKD AND RR
For simplicity we consider the use of coherent states in CV-QKD homodyne protocols.
Squeezed states is highly susceptible to all the linear loss in the system and also would,
as are other CV-QKD protocols, be subject to all the security points we will make in this
paper. Let T be the transmittance of the transmission link which does not include the loss
in other system components. Generally our analysis is carried out under the assumption
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that everything else is perfect unless indicated otherwise.
In CV-QKD the coherent state complex amplitude x + ip is drawn from a circularly
symmetric Gaussian distribution of zero mean and variance V in units of 1/4 photon for the
field mode, which is the level of noise when x or p is measured in homodyning. The user A
sends a long sequence of such pulses, each independently drawn, to user B who checks the
noise variance of a randomly chosen subsequence by asking A for the corresponding x or p
in each such pulse. This is to establish an advantage, over a possible attacker Eve, on the
rest of the pulses to obtain key generation. Then B measures either x or p randomly on the
other pulses. Common key bit values are to be derived from reconciliation between A and
B’s quadrature values before privacy amplification to bring down Eve’s information per bit.
Mutual information is used to measure the users’ advantage over Eve, which has numerous
problems in crypto-security, especially for a finite system. See [5,10,11]. However, that is not
our real concern here, and the difficulties we will point to cannot be overcome by a mutual
information argument.
In direct reconciliation, the users derive key bits by B trying to estimate what A sent
in the measured quadrature. This is often accomplished by ”sliced error correction” [3-4].
There is then a 3 dB loss limit on getting quantum advantage [1], due to Eve’s beamsplitter
attack in which she splits off half of the signal and delivers the other half via a lossless link
to B. Eve would then get an identical copy of the signal at B, and any resulting advantage
that may result is of a classical nature from the different noises that B and Eve suffer in
their measurements [6,12].
In reverse reconciliation (RR), it is A who tries to guess what B has measured. The
rationale is that A clearly knows the sent values of x or p better than Eve, and thus an
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advantage over Eve is assured whe they both try to estimate what B has measured. The
sliced error correction protocol for reconciliation is also often used [3-4], though other error
correction approaches have been suggested [5]. Indeed, it is often maintained that RR would
”in principle” ensure net key generation for any value of T .
To represent the RR situation, let m be the parameter value of x or p that A intends
for the pulse. Let mB and mE be the homodyne result of B and Eve’s measurement at the
receiving and split-off part of the signal. Then
mB =
√
Tm+ nB (1)
mE =
√
1− Tm+ nE (2)
where the additive noises nB and nE have
var nB = var nE = 1 (3)
It is clear the users have no advantage in direct reconciliation under the beamsplitter attack
(1)-(2) when T ≤ 1
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.
Even if the parameters T and m are precisely known to the users, it is clear from (1)-(3)
that for a sufficiently small T the user A would just be guessing at the value of nB in RR
which has nothing to do with the signal or any quantum advantage over E! Also, for T ≪ 1,
Eve knows m basically as well as A does. Since the numerical value of an analog quantity
does not have physical meaning after a certain number of decimal places, and indeed is often
known to only, say within 1% of its nominal value, one may say instead there is very much
an in-principle limit on T in RR also.
Equally significantly, if a system does not possess robustness in performance within the
parameter accuracy limit, it is unstable to operate and is not a viable design for real world
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applications. In the case of QKD, there is the added issue of false alarm that has never been
quantitatively studied, in which the users abort a round although there is no Eve present.
In the case of a ”supersensitive” (very much not robust) protocol, false alarm would occur
so frequently that it would prevent its operation altogether.
In the following we will consider the situation in which Eve launches a heterodyne
intercept-resend attack near the transmitter, which does not require the unrealistic loss-
less link replacement underlying (1)-(2) and is readily implementable. We will also indicate
that the leak of information to Eve from reconciliation in QKD has never been correctly
quantified [11]. Indeed, from (1)-(3) it appears that even for moderate values of T , in RR
Eve would learn about mB as much as A would up to many decimal places, in either open
exchange or forward error correction. Certainly there is no justification that the leak is given
by the usual leakEC expression [4] which is not generally applicable to begin with.
III HETERODYNE ATTACK AND ROBUSTNESS
Eve can easily launch an intercept-resend attack by heterodyne measurement on both x and
p near the transmitter and resend the measured value as the complex amplitude in a coherent
state through the link. Again consider RR with m being A’s launching value of B’s chosen
quadrature. As explained in the following, in a realistic system A only knows m as mA to
within an additive noise nA, the variance of which depends on exactly what A does at the
transmitter. In place of (1)-(2) we now have, with var n˜E = 2,
mB =
√
T (m+ n˜E) + nB (4)
mE = m+ n˜E (5)
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mA = m+ nA (6)
It is clear from (4)-(6) that Eve could determine m better than B in direct reconciliation.
In RR, Eve could determine mB better than A from whatever reconciliation algorithm even
when nA = 0. Thus security is totally breached unless Eve is caught heterodyning. However,
the latter seems practically impossible and the cryptosystem is in principle supersensitive,
because link and other system component losses need to be very accurately determined and,
moreover, to remain the same over all the pulses in the round, as follows.
First, consider the V value chosen by A that leads to m in a coherent state from a
laser, with m2 far lower than the laser output intensity when it is operating far above
threshold for suppressed intensity fluctuation. Large m values would mean the added unity
heterodyne noise compared to homodyne is totally insignificant. Large laser output needs
to be strongly attenuated to get the chosen V , the variance of m. For sufficiently small
attenuation coefficient the relative fluctuation of its value is huge and A cannot know m
at all to within a few units of quantum noise. It appears necessary to split the pulse and
homodyne on one part to determine the quadrature value on the transmitted pulse. In fact,
due to the relatively large (typically a few percent) margin of accuracy in all laser output
power, though it is stable over a long duration, such measurement by A is necessary for
pinning down m. Thus nA is at least one unit strong even if there is no other imperfection
such as the value of the beamsplitter transmittance.
The serious problem, however, comes from the accuracy of loss and m values. To check
the presence of Eve’s heterodyne attack, B would use (4) and (6) to detect possible added
fluctuation from
√
T n˜E . It has been appreciated from the beginning of CV-QKD that excess
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noise and homodyne detection efficiency need to be carefully monitored [5,13]. An experiment
on heterodyne attack was carried out [14]. What seems not appreciated is that all the
loss values need to be very accurate and stable. To include other system losses such as
detector quantum efficiency and homodyne efficiency, one can interprete T in (4) as the total
transmittance instead of just link loss. If T deviates from the presumed value by 2%, anm2 =
25 photons commonly employed [3] would imply Eve’s heterodyne attack cannot be detected
even apart from finite statistical fluctuation. For a proper security analysis, one would
need to represent exactly how each loss parameter enters into the system representation,
with finite fluctuation fully accounted for in a complete statistical analysis. For example,
if A uses a 50/50 beamsplitter to determine the m value after the laser output is strongly
attenuated, the beamsplitter transmittance cannot be smaller by 0.1% for m = 10 and total
10 dB user loss in order not to confuse Eve’s added noise as part of the signal. In the other
direction, false alarm would result. It does not appear such a supersensitive cryptosystem
can be practically similar to the cases of classical resolution beyond the diffraction limit and
singular detection in non-white Gaussian noise.
IV OTHER SERIOUS ISSUES
A most serious problem is Eve’s information gain from reconciliation. Under (1)-(2) in which
Eve’s presence cannot be detected in principle, Eve still would learn a lot since mE and mA
from (2) and (6) imply Eve and A are in similar positions with respect to mB, that there is
really no advantage to A. Even when nA = 0, the advantage seems small and it is not clear
why the users can derive a net key in a finite protocol. The problem can be traced in part to
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the lack of a quantitative bound on Eve’s information gain in any reconciliation procedure
[11], except asymptotically for linear error correcting codes under collective attacks in BB84.
There is no definite proven result for CV-QKD either in [4].
Collective attack, however, is very unreasonably restrictive in both BB84 and CV-QKD.
For example, when Eve attacks a portion of the pulses and leaves the rest intact, it is outside
the scope of collective attack. On the other hand, Eve may well choose to do that to escape
detection while gaining a considerable amount of information. It is intuitively impossible
that collective attack is optimal for Eve, and the known ”proofs” that it is are not valid.
This and the many general inadequacies of QKD security proofs in BB84 and CV-QKD are
to be treated elsewhere, while a glimpse can be found in [11].
V ROBUST SECURITY
Robustness with respect to parameter accuracy and fluctuation is crucial in engineering
systems. Quantum information system is often very sensitive to disturbance, which is likely
one main reason why it is so difficult to realize experimentally. Security is something that can
only be established theoretically if at all, because there are an unlimited number of possible
attack scenarios and the history of cryptography shows that relying on security from past
experience can be dangerous. In physical cryptography such as QKD where security depends
on physics at least as much as on mathematics, it is therefore mandatory to establish robust
security carefully on a complete representation of the physical cryptosystem. This has not
been done in CV-QKD or BB84, and must be addressed if QKD is ever going to be practically
useful.
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